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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 970746-CA
Priority No. 2

MINH NGOC HA,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a) (1998) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996), whereby the defendant in a district court
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final order for anything other than a first degree or capital
felony.

Appellant Minh Ngoc Ha ("Ha") was convicted of

aggravated assault, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (a) (Supp. 1996), and assault, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp.
1996).

The judgments are attached hereto as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issues presented for review are as follows:
1.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to comply with

the Utah Code of Judicial Administration when it allowed an
unqualified interpreter to translate trial testimony.
Standard of Review: The issue presented is a matter of
"statutory construction which is reviewed for correctness." Price
v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah 1997) (citing State v.
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991)).

Also, this Court may

review matters under the plain error standard that affect a
party's substantial rights. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853
(Utah 1992) .
2.

Whether the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct

in closing argument.
Standard of Review:

In assessing the prosecutor's

statements, this Court will make a determination of whether the
prosecutor brought improper information to the jurors' attention,
and whether such information probably influenced the jurors.
State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984).

If this Court

views the evidence of guilt to be ambiguous or in conflict with
other evidence, this Court will "more closely scrutinize the
conduct."

Id.

When objections are not made at trial, appellate

review is under a "plain error" standard.

State v. Palmer, 860

P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993).
3.

Whether trial counsel rendered constitutionally

deficient assistance in failing to object to prosecutorial
misconduct, and failing to seek a curative instruction.
Standard of Review:

"When, as in this case, the claim of

ineffective assistance is raised for the first time on appeal, we
resolve the issue as a matter of law."

State v. Gallecros. 355

Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Strain,
885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994)).
4.

Whether the cumulative effect of the errors and

irregularities in the case prevented Ha from presenting his

2

defense and denied him a fair trial.
Standard of Review: Reversal is appropriate if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines confidence that a
fair trial was had.
1993).

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah

In assessing cumulative error, this Court considers all

the identified errors as well as errors this Court assumes may
have occurred. Id.
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
With respect to the first and second issues on appeal, they
were not preserved in the record but may be reviewed under the
plain error doctrine.

State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah

App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993); State v. Labrum,
925 P.2d 937, 940-41 (Utah 1996). The third issue, ineffective
assistance of counsel, may be reviewed for the first time on
direct appeal by this Court.
(Utah 1998).

State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50

The fourth issue concerning cumulative error is

reviewed on direct appeal where the record is adequate.

See e.g.

Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following rule and constitutional provisions will be
determinative of the issues on appeal:
Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306 (1998).
Utah Const, art. I, § 1 2 .
U.S. Const, amend. VI.
The text of those provisions is contained in Addendum B.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in the Court Below.
In January 1997, Ha was charged by Information with one
count of aggravated assault, a second degree felony in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(a) (Supp. 1996), and one count of
assault, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-102 (Supp. 1996) , in connection with an incident that
allegedly occurred in May 1996. (R. 34-36.)

During the trial of

this matter, Ha was represented by private counsel. (R. 13.)
The jury found Ha guilty of each charged offense and the
trial judge sentenced him to concurrent prison terms. (R. 128-29;
131-32.)

Ha is incarcerated.

Thereafter, private counsel

withdrew from the case, and the trial court appointed Salt Lake
Legal Defender Association to represent Ha for purposes of the
appeal.

(R. 142; 162.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On May 19, 1996, Tai Luu was stabbed in the back at a dance
club parking lot. (R. 193:45-52.) Hanna Kim was struck in the
face with the butt of a knife during the same encounter. (R.
193:92.) Ha was arrested and charged with aggravated assault and
assault allegedly for inflicting the injuries on Luu and Kim. (R.
34-36.)
The case went to trial. Because Appellant Ha and defense
witness Tran Nguyen spoke only Vietnamese, they requested the
assistance of an interpreter. (R. 193:4, 134, 162-63.)

4

During

its case-in-chief the state presented three witnesses, who
testified to the events.
the circumstances varied.

The witnesses' testimony surrounding
Luu admitted that during the assault,

it was dark in the parking lot, and he testified that during a
police photo array, he identified Ha and one other person as the
possible assailant. (R. 193:63, 77; Exhibit 6.)

Witness Vu Tran

testified that he did not observe Ha in possession of a knife and
he did not witness the assaults.

(R. 193:121.)

During opening statement, Ha's counsel made specific
representations with respect to the evidence that he anticipated
the defense would present. Counsel asserted that the evidence
would show that Ha was at the dance club on May 19, 1996, but he
left the club before the assaults.

(R. 193:133.) Counsel then

called Ha to testify first in the defendant's case. (R. 193:134.)
The testimony at times was confusing, unresponsive or unclear.1
^ o r example, defense counsel asked Ha if he remembered May
19, 1996. Ha's answer was confusing: "I don't remember what
night, but I remember come there a couple times." (R. 193:136.)
In addition, during direct examination, Ha testified that he
resided in Salt Lake until June 1996 when he left for Texas, as
he did each year, to work. (R. 193:139-40.) Ha also testified
that he worked in Utah during the months of March and April 1996.
Thereafter, the prosecutor responded on cross-examination that
"from the middle of March to the end of April, you did not have a
job."
(R. 193:145-46.) Ha corrected the prosecutor. The
prosecutor then questioned Ha about his employment again. Ha
explained that every year between March and May he went to Texas
to work. (R. 193:147.) While Ha had already testified on direct
examination that he postponed going to Texas until approximately
June 1996 (R. 193:139-40 (Ha stayed in Texas for a month after
May)), the prosecutor's examination created confusion with
respect to the matter. Specifically, after Ha stated that he went
to Texas every year between March and May, the prosecutor stated
"May of 1996" then asked the interpreter, "he went to Texas to
work?"
(R. 193:147.) Ha answered yes. It is not clear from the
(continued...)
5

After Ha testified, a second interpreter, who was not
certified or qualified to translate the Vietnamese language in
this jurisdiction, was sworn to translate Nguyen's testimony. (R.
193:162-63.)

The record reflects the following with respect to

the second interpreter:
MR. BARBER (Counsel for Ha): We would call Tran Nguyen.
And, your Honor, she does not speak English. I do have an
interpreter present [] to translate her testimony.
THE COURT: Very well. Let's have your interpreter come
forward and take the oath.
Has this person been certified? To your knowledge, Mr.
Barber, has the interpreter been certified?
MR. BARBER: Have you been certified?
MR. HUYNH (Interpreter): Actually, we don't have such
vocation in Utah, but I do perform vocation in front of the
Industrial Commission.
THE COURT: I mean through the administrative office of the
courts. But apparently not.
Your name, sir?
MR.HUYNH: Tarn, T-A-M and the last name is spelled H-U-Y-N-H.
THE COURT: Will you, sir, please raise your right hand and
take the oath of interpreter?
(R. 193:162-63.)

Thereafter, counsel for the defense made a

statement to the jury with respect to the interpreter:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I want to advise you
in advance of questioning Ms. Nguyen, that [Tarn], who's the
(...continued)
examination whether Ha was responding that he went to Texas to
work, or that he went to Texas in May of 1996 to work. The
prosecutor took advantage of the confusion in closing argument:
"Minh Ha himself said he was in Texas the month of May 1996. His
sister Tran said, "Oh, yeah, oh, but he was in Salt Lake County
May of 1996.' They couldn't even get their stories straight about
when he was here. He claims he wasn't here at all, he was in
Texas working." (R. 193:197.) That incorrect statement in closing
was used to discredit Ha.
6

interpreter, is a friend of Ms. Nguyen's
includes the defendant, Mr. Minh Ha. He
during the trial. He was present during
hearing that we had in this case and has
throughout the various court proceedings
us to trial today.

family. That
has been present
the preliminary
been present
that have brought

(R. 193:164.)
Nothing in the record suggests that Ha waived the right to
have an interpreter pursuant to Rule 3-306 translate the
testimony or that the trial judge otherwise complied with the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration when he appointed a nonqualified, non-certified interpreter to translate the testimony.
(See R. 193, generally.) As Nguyen testified during the
proceedings, the trial judge twice made reference to language
barriers and communication problems.

(R. 193:166, 168.)

During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the case
came down to identity: "The question really that you have to ask
yourself and the major issue in the case is did Mr. Minh Ha stab
Tai Luu and hit Hanna Kim or are they just simply mistaken about
who it is that did this?

Because that's what this comes down to.

It's an issue of[,] was he the one that did it."

(R. 193:181.)

The prosecutor emphasized that the case hinged on the state's
witnesses identifying a tattoo in the middle of the perpetrator's
forehead. According to the prosecutor "When you consider the
uniqueness of the tattoo, it comes down to a very small, small
number. In fact, it might just be one, and that one would be Ha
Minh - - o r Minh Ha, I'm sorry." (R. 193:183.)
During rebuttal, the prosecutor stated again, "So I go back
to the question, how many people are going to have a tattoo in
7

the middle of their forehead in this society?

There isn't going

to be anyone but the defendant. That's how he's identified, and
there might be a mistake about his height, his weight, his hair
style, but it's unmistakable about the tattoo in the middle of
his forehead." (R. 193:199.)
The jury was provided with a cautionary instruction that
eyewitness identification testimony may be unreliable for various
reasons. (R. 90-92.) The instruction recognized that identifications made from a photograph are less reliable. In this case, two
witnesses testified that they identified Ha from a photo array.
They also described the perpetrator as a man with a tattoo on his
forehead.

Ha was the only individual in the photo array with a

tattoo on his forehead. (See R. 193:63, 97; Exhibits 5 and 6.)
The jury found Ha guilty of assault and aggravated assault,
and the trial judge sentenced him to prison. Ha is incarcerated.
(R. 193:205-06.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Rule 3-306, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, provides
for the service of interpreters in this jurisdiction. It sets
forth certification procedures for interpreters in foreign
languages. The rule also recognizes that where no certification
program is established for a specific language, a "qualified"
interpreter may be appointed to translate in a case. Further, a
non-certified, non-qualified interpreter may be used to translate
testimony only after the trial court has made certain
determinations with respect to the proceedings.
8

In this case, a

non-qualified, non-certified interpreter was appointed to
translate testimony.

In connection with the appointment, the

trial court failed to make the determinations set forth in Rule
3-3 06.

The trial court erred as a matter of law. Although the

issue concerning the translator's qualifications was not raised
below, the issue may be reviewed under the plain error standard.
The prosecutor represented during closing argument that
statistics support that Ha is the only person with a tattoo of a
question mark on his forehead.
support of that claim.

No evidence was presented in

The prosecutor's statements went beyond

the evidence and were improper under the plain error doctrine,
where case law and the professional rules of conduct prohibit
attorneys from alluding to matters not introduced in evidence at
trial.
effect.

In addition, the improper comments had a prejudicial
The prosecutor knew the case hinged on identification

and made unsupported statistical representations to support the
state's case.
In addition, trial counsel for Ha failed to object to the
improper remarks. Trial counsel's performance was deficient and
prejudicial to the outcome of the trial.

Ha was denied effective

assistance of counsel in violation of the state and federal
constitutions.

He is entitled to a new trial on that basis.
ARGUMENT

POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO COMPLY WITH
RULE 3-306 IN APPOINTING A NON-QUALIFIED, NON-CERTIFIED
INTERPRETER TO TRANSLATE TESTIMONY,

9

The plain-error doctrine considers whether the trial court
failed to comply with the plain requirements of the law.
In general, to establish the existence of plain error and to
obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not
properly objected to, the appellant must show the following:
(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful,
i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased
differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined.11
See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989); State v.
Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Utah 1988); State v. Knight,
734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987); State v. Fontana, 680
P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984); see also rstate v. Eldredae,
773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989)]; CJU Utah R.Evid. 103(d);
Utah R.Crim.P. 19(c). If any one of these requirements is
not met, plain error is not established. Cf. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992); Verde, 770 P.2d at 123.
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). In this case,
the court committed plain error in appointing Huynh to translate
testimony.

The court failed to comply with the clear language of

Rule 3-306, Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
The current Rule 3-3 06 was enacted in 1996 to "secure the
rights of persons who are unable, because of a non-English
speaking cultural background, to understand or communicate
adequately in the English language when they are involved in
legal proceedings."

Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306 (1998).

To that end, the rule mandates the appointment of a
"certified" interpreter when an interpreter is "requested or when
the appointing authority determines that a principal party in
interest or witness has a limited ability to understand and
communicate in English."

Id. at 3-306(6)(A).

Certification

contemplates training, testing, continuing education, and recertifying interpreters in accordance with a program established
10

by the court administrative office.

Id. at 3-306(4).

If a certified interpreter is not available to translate,
the trial court may appoint a non-certified interpreter "under
those circumstances specified in subsection (6)(B) or (C)" of the
rule.

Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(6) (A).

Subsection (6) (B)

allows for the appointment of a "qualified" interpreter if no
certification program has been established for interpreters in a
specific language.

Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(6)(B).

"Qualification" contemplates that the appointing authority
ask questions of the interpreter concerning specific matters that
reflect the interpreters ability to translate. Id.

The rule

provides that the procedure to qualify an interpreter "need not
recur every time the interpreter is used," and the names of
qualified interpreters shall be placed on a list for use in
district court cases where a certified interpreter is not
reasonably available.

Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306 (6) (B) (iii) .

According to the rule, both qualified and certified
interpreters are held to a "minimum performance standard." The
standard mandates that all "certified and qualified interpreters
serving in the court shall comply with the Code of Professional
Responsibility" (hereinafter the "Code"). Utah Code Jud. Admin.
3-306(3).

A copy of the Code is attached hereto as Addendum C.

The Code holds interpreters to specific ethical standards.

Pursuant to 3-306(6) (C) , a non-qualified,

non-certified

interpreter may be appointed to translate in court proceedings
under the following conditions:
11

[W]hen a certified or qualified interpreter is not
reasonably available, or the court determines that the
gravity of the case and potential penalty to the accused
person involved are so minor that delays attendant to
obtaining a certified or qualified interpreter are not
justified.
Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(6) (C).

The non-qualified, non-

certified interpreter is not held to the "minimum performance
standard" or to compliance with the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

See Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(3).

Thus, the

rule contemplates use of such an interpreter in limited
circumstances.
Finally, Rule 3-306 provides that a person may waive the
right to the services of an interpreter as set forth in the rule
"only when" the following occurs:
[(7)(A)](i) the waiver is approved by the appointing
authority after explaining on the record to the non-English
speaking person through an interpreter the nature and effect
of the waiver;
(ii) the appointing authority determines on the record that
the waiver has been made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily; and
(iii) the non-English speaking person has been afforded the
opportunity to consult with his or her attorney.
Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-3 06.
The waiver provisions of Rule 3-306 are consistent with
earlier Utah case law, where the Utah Supreme Court recognized
that certain rights require personal waiver by the defendant,
including the right to trial, the right to trial by jury, the
right to be present at trial, and the right to an interpreter at
trial.

See State v. Butterfield. 784 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah 1989)

(citing People v. Mata Aguilar, 677 P.2d 1198, 1204, 200
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Cal.Rptr. 908, 914-15 (1984)).
A unifying characteristic of these rights appears to be that
they are of central importance to the quality of the guiltdetermining process and the defendant's ability to
participate in that process.
Butterfield, 784 P.2d at 156.
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 3-3 06 IN
APPOINTING AN INTERPRETER CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND PLAIN ERROR.
Under an earlier version of Rule 3-306, this Court
determined that a trial court's appointment of an interpreter is
subject to reversal only for an abuse of discretion.

State v.

Fung, 907 P. 2d 1192, 1194 (Utah App. 1995); see also State v.
Truiillo, 214 P.2d 626, 634-35 (Utah 1950) (before lower court is
overruled in use of interpreter, there should be evidence of
abuse of discretion).

Also, "the burden rests with the defendant

to show that he was somehow denied a fair trial by the
interpreter's deficiencies."

Fung, 907 P.2d at 1194 (citing

State v. Mendoza, 891 P.2d 939, 942 (Ariz. App. 1995)).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized in numerous cases that
failure to comply with Utah law constitutes an abuse of
discretion as well as plain error.

See State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d

937 (Utah 1996) (trial court's failure to comply with statutory
law constituted plain error); State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133,
1135-36 (Utah 1989) (lower court overruled for abuse of
discretion where judge failed to consider statutory factors);
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 861 (Utah 1992) (record failed to
reflect that trial judge considered facts in light of statutory
law: "if this issue recurs on remand, we instruct the trial judge
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to consider [the statutory factor] and to make findings"); State
v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1991) (record reflected that
trial judge fully complied with statutory requirements; thus, no
abuse of discretion); State v. Russell. 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah
1990) (record reflected that trial court properly considered
legal factors; thus, no abuse of discretion); State v. McCovey,
803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) ("An abuse of discretion results
when the judge 'fails to consider all legally relevant
factors 1 "); State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Utah 1989)
(judge's discretion lies within limits prescribed by law); State
v. Kelly, 784 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1989) (discretion is within
statutory limits); State v. Jolivet. 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah
1986) (discretion is limited by law); State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d
1210, 1219-20 (Utah 1984) (statutory law prescribes the bounds of
the trial court's discretion); see also State v. Begishe, 937
P.2d. 527, 532 (Utah App. 1997) (trial court exceeded its
discretion in denying continuance for prosecutor's failure to
comply with discovery statute and rule).
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion in
appointing Tarn Huynh to serve as an interpreter.

Huynh was not

qualified under Rule 3-306(6) (B) or certified under Rule 3306(6) (A) to translate testimony (see R. 193:162-63), and the
trial court failed to make the specific inquiry for the
appointment of a non-certified, non-qualified interpreter as set
forth at Rule 3-306(6) (C) .

(See R. 193 generally.)

That is, the

court failed to determine that a "certified or qualified
14

interpreter [was] not reasonably available" or that "the gravity
of the case and potential penalty to the accused person involved
[were] so minor that delays attendant to obtaining a certified or
qualified interpreter [were] not justified."

Utah Code Jud.

Admin. 3-306(6) (C) . Because Huynh was not qualified or certified,
he was not held to the minimum performance standards or the Code
of Professional Responsibility for Interpreters.

See Utah Code

Jud. Admin. 3-3 06(3) and (8); Addendum C, hereto.
Since the court failed to appoint Huynh in accordance with
Rule 3-306(6), the appointment was the equivalent of failing to
designate an interpreter under the rule. The court in that
instance was required to take a waiver from Ha before allowing
the matter to proceed. See Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(7)

(1998).

Subsection (7) requires the trial court to obtain a specific
waiver on the record.

See also Butterfield, 784 P.2d at 156.

Here, the court failed to comply with those provisions; it failed
to "approve" waiver "after explaining on the record to the nonEnglish speaking person" the nature and effect of waiver; and it
failed to determine "on the record" that such a waiver was made
"knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily."

Utah Code Jud.

Admin. 3-306(7).
In Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Utah 1997), the
Utah Supreme Court recognized that failure to comply with the
plain language of a rule set forth in the code of judicial
administration constituted a "clear violation" of the law.

Since

nothing in the record here reflects compliance with Rule 3-306 in
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the appointment of Huynh as interpreter, the appointment
constituted a clear abuse of discretion and violation of the law.
Ha has satisfied the first prong of the plain-error analysis.
B. THE ERROR SHOULD HAVE BEEN OBVIOUS TO THE TRIAL COURT.
Prior to appointing Huynh to serve as interpreter, the trial
court asked whether Huynh was certified to serve in such a capacity under Utah law. (R. 193:162-63.)
not.

(Id.)

Huynh replied that he was

Thereafter, the judge failed to make the inquiry

that he was required to make under Utah law. Once Huynh disclosed
his lack of qualification/certification to serve as interpreter
in this jurisdiction, Rule 3-306(6)(C) contemplated appointment
only under limited circumstances. The judge's failure to comply
with the plain language of the Rule constituted obvious error,
satisfying the second prong of the plain-error analysis.
C. UNDER THE PREJUDICE PRONG, HA MUST SHOW THAT HE WAS
DENIED A FAIR TRIAL.
Next, Ha must show "that he was somehow denied a fair trial
by the interpreter's deficiencies."

Fung, 907 P.2d at 1194

(citing State v. Mendoza, 891 P.2d 939, 942 (Ariz. App. 1995));
see also State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 737 (Utah App.), cert,
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991) (defendant failed to show
prejudice).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional
significance of the use of an interpreter. Failure to properly
provide an interpreter may in certain circumstances deny defendant the right to be present during proceedings, the right to
assist counsel in his defense, and the right to present witnesses
IS

in his defense. See State v. Vasquez, 121 P.2d 903, 905 (Utah
1942); State v. Masato Karumai, 126 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Utah 1942).
Specifically, if a defendant does not speak English and the
court refuses to provide a proper interpreter, "from some points
of view it is analogous to [the defendant] being out of hearing."
Vasquez, 121 P.2d at 905.
[I]n a criminal prosecution the accused has the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel and to be
confronted by the witness against him. "He had the right to
see and be seen, hear and be heard, under such reasonable
regulations as the law established[,] by our constitution."
Id.

Failure to provide defendant with a proper interpreter may

interfere with those rights and deny defendant a fair trial. Id.
"The constitutional right to be confronted by witnesses
against him, and to defend in person, would be of little
avail to the accused if he could be compelled to remain away
during his trial, out of the sight and hearing of the
witnesses against him." We have authority for the position
that the defendant has the right to see the witness
testifying against him and to hear what the witness says.
Are these rights more essential, or even as essential, than
the right to understand what is going on in the proceeding?
Suppose a defendant were placed in a transparent compartment
where he could see all that took place, yet was deprived of
hearing what was said because all sound was cut off, could
it be said that such a situation were less than a
deprivation of the constitutional right of confrontation?
The purpose of the confrontation must be to permit the
defendant to be advised of the proceedings against him.
Degrees of understanding may present themselves between
that of complete comprehension of the language to that of
minor matters. The question, not properly heard or
understood, may bring forth an answer that might turn the
scales from innocence to guilt or from guilt to innocence.
Then, too, the answer given might be made in words not
entirely familiar or understood by the defendant. Mr.
Justice Holmes once wrote: "A word is not a crystal,
transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according
to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."
Town v. Eisner, 1918, 245 U.S. 418, at page 425, 38 S.Ct.
158, at page 159, 62 L.Ed. 372, L.R.A. 1918D, 254.
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Id.

Also, in Masato Karumai the court stated:
In this type of case [where defendant is entitled to have
the proceedings translated] there is a serious possibility
of grave injustice being done an accused by reason of his
being unable to properly present his defense due to his
inability to speak or understand the language in which the
trial is conducted. Thus it is the duty of the Court to
take whatever steps are necessary to prevent injustice ....

Masato Karumai, 126 P.2d at 1050; see also State v. Doporto, 935
P.2d 484, 494-95 (Utah 1997) ("failure to provide adequate
hearing assistance would be equivalent to trying Doporto in
absentia. The unfortunate part of hearing loss is that a hearingimpaired person may not know what he does not hear").
Thus, failure to provide a proper interpreter may violate
defendant's right to be present at trial under Article I, Section
12 of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the federal constitution; defendant's right to
confront witnesses under those same provisions (see Vasquez, 121
P.2d at 905 (accused cannot confront witness whose language he
cannot understand)); and defendant's opportunity to present his
defense, also under those same provisions.

Where an improper

interpreter is used, testimony translated to the jury and
counsel, and questions translated to the witness may be
inaccurate.

"The question, not properly heard or understood, may

bring forth an answer that might turn the scales from innocence
to guilt or from guilt to innocence." Vasquez, 121 P.2d at 905.
Inasmuch as failure to provide a proper interpreter violates
a defendant's constitutional rights, the "fair trial" analysis
should contemplate application of the constitutional harmless18

error standard. Under that standard, for an error to be held
harmless, this court must "sincerely believe that it was harmless
beyond

a reasonable

doubt."

State v. Dahlquist, 931 P.2d 862,867

(Utah App. 1997) (emphasis in original).
Since the person appointed to translate Nguyen's testimony
was not a proper interpreter, and the judge failed to employ any
safeguards to ensure accurate translation, see Fung, 907 P.2d at
1194 (trial court found that interpreter had adequate
understanding of court system and terms used in proceedings to
provide translation; also, court instructed interpreter to alert
court to any difficulties in translating), there is no way to
know the degree to which Nguyen's testimony was inaccurately
translated, or what questions/responses would have followed if
the testimony had been correctly translated.

The legal error

prevented Ha from presenting Nguyen as a witness.
call the witness in his defense was violated.

Ha's right to

Utah Const, art.

I, § 12; U.S. Const. V, VI, XIV.
Further, because the trial court failed to appoint an
interpreter as provided under Rule 3-306, the presumptions and
regularities set forth in that rule are not applicable.

That is,

Rule 3-306 requires the certified and qualified interpreter to
comply with the minimum performance standards, including ethical
rules applicable to interpreters. See Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3306(4) and (8). If the court appoints an interpreter in "clear
violation" of the rule, see Price, 949 P.2d at 1255, it cannot be
fairly presumed that Huynh complied with the minimum performance
19

standards, the code of professional responsibility, or the oath
provision set forth in Rule 3-306.

See e.g. Salt Lake City v.

Emerson, 861 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 1993) (where full compliance
with law creates presumption of validity, failure to comply with
law means that validity may not be presumed).
In this case, if Nguyen had testified to the facts as
identified by defense counsel in his opening statement, that is,
that Ha had returned home from the dance club before the assaults
(see R. 193:133), the jury would have been required to weigh
Nguyen's testimony and credibility against that of (1) Luu (who
testified that he identified another person as well as Ha as the
perpetrator and that the parking lot was dark and he was being
assaulted and running when he observed the perpetrator (R. 193:
68-69, 77-78)), (2) Tran (who did not witness the assaults (R.
193:121)), and (3) Kim (who identified Ha as the perpetrator).
Kim testified that she saw the perpetrator in the dark
parking lot during the early hours of the morning while she was
crying.

(R. 193:111, 88, 97.) At the same time that she was

observing the perpetrator, Kim was protecting Luu from further
assault, and she was being assaulted across the face. (R. 193:92,
102-03.) In this case, the jury was cautioned to seriously
consider those factors that may affect Kim and Luu's ability to
provide reliable eye-witness identification. (R. 90-92.)
The instruction directed jurors to consider matters
affecting Kim's and Luu's observations, such as the light
available to the observer, and the emotional and physical strains
20

on the observer, including fatigue, drug or alcohol use, and
whether the observer was experiencing stress.

(See R. 90-92);

see also State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-489 (Utah 1986).

Thus,

reliability concerns surrounded the testimony presented through
the state's witnesses in this case.
Since it is difficult to know the degree to which Nguyen's
testimony was inaccurately translated, or what questions/
responses would have followed if the testimony had been correctly
translated, it is likewise difficult to know whether Nguyen's
testimony accurately translated through a proper interpreter
would have tipped the balance in favor of finding a more
favorable result for Ha.

The possibility exists that the jury

would have believed Nguyen over Kim if Nguyen's testimony had
been translated accurately by a proper interpreter.
To be harmless under a constitutional analysis, evidence
must be so powerful and cumulative that the error would not have
swayed the jury's judgment. State v. Dahlquist. 931 P.2d 862, 867
(Utah App. 1997). Since the evidence in this case was not so
powerful or cumulative, the legal error here was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.2
2 In the event this Court is inclined to apply the reasonablelikelihood, harmless-error standard, under that standard, the
reviewing court is to decide whether, considering all the
evidence, there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury would
have decided the case differently. State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d
1116, 1122 (Utah 1989). The analysis focuses on the taint caused
by the error. Here the taint may have prevented the jury from
considering Nguyen's testimony. A proper translation may have
tipped the balance in favor of Ha, since Luu's eyewitness
testimony was unsure, Tran did not witness the assaults, and the
(continued...)
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POINT II. THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT DURING
CLOSING ARGUMENT BY MAKING IMPROPER STATEMENTS.
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two prong test for
reversals for improper statements of counsel:
[The test is,] did the remarks call to the attention of the
jurors matters which they would not be justified in
considering in determining their verdict, and were they,
under the circumstances of the particular case, probably
influenced by those remarks.
State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973); accord State v.
Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992); State v. Troy, 688 P.2d
483, 486 (Utah 1984); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah
App. 1993) .
In this case, during closing argument the prosecutor made
remarks that called the attention of the jurors to circumstances
that were not presented in evidence and that they were not
justified in considering in connection with a verdict.
Specifically, the prosecutor twice represented that
statistically, Ha was the only person with a tattoo of a question
mark on his forehead. (R. 193:183, 199.)

During the prosecutor's

initial closing argument he stated:
When you consider the uniqueness of the tattoo, it comes
down to a very small, small number. In fact, it might just
be one, and that one would be Ha Minh - - o r Minh Ha, I'm
sorry.

(...continued)
jury was cautioned to seriously consider factors affecting Kim's
and Luu's ability to provide reliable eyewitness identification.
Given the concerns surrounding the eyewitness testimony presented
through state witnesses there was a reasonable likelihood that
the jury would have decided the case differently. Ha has
satisfied the reasonable-likelihood, harmless-error standard.
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(R. 193:183.)

The prosecutor also stated that if Ha were

innocent, his attorney would explain Ha's tattoo.

(R. 193:186.)

Ha's counsel did not object to those incorrect and improper
statements during the prosecutor's initial closing.

Rather, the

defense attorney responded to them, pointing out to the jury in
closing argument that the statistical information was not based
in facts of record, the jury was required to consider the
evidence, and the defense did not have the burden of proving
innocence as the prosecutor had represented. (R.193:188, 195-96.)
Thereafter, the prosecutor made his surrebuttal comments,
and with greater conviction represented that statistically
speaking, Ha was the only person in society with a tattoo of a
question mark on his forehead: "So I go back to the question, how
many people are going to have a tattoo in the middle of their
forehead in this society?

There isn't going to be anyone but the

defendant. That's how he's identified, and there might be a
mistake about his height, his weight, his hair style, but it's
unmistakable about the tattoo in the middle of his forehead."
(R. 193:199.)

Since the state failed to present statistical

information to support the prosecutor's comments, the surrebuttal
comments were improper.
The prosecutor's assertions went beyond the actual evidence
presented, and served to bolster the eyewitness identification
testimony.

Defense counsel did not object to the surrebuttal

comments when they occurred.

(R. 193:199.)

plain error on appeal.
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Thus, Ha argues

The Utah Supreme Court has identified the test for establishing plain error as set forth in Point I, supra. Specifically,
the appellant must show "(i) An error exists;
should have been obvious to the trial court;

(ii) the error
and (iii) the error

is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or
phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is
undermined."

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993);

State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App. 1993) .
Considering the first and second factors in Dunn, the error
exists and should have been obvious to the trial court. Case law
and the rules of professional conduct prohibit an attorney from
alluding to matters not introduced as evidence at trial. State v.
Young, 853 P.2d 327, 349 (Utah 1993); Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct 3.4(e) (1997); Palmer, 860 P.2d at 343. The Utah appellate
courts have reiterated that it is error for a prosecutor to
allude to the existence of prejudicial facts where the prosecutor
has failed to prove those facts. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781,
785-86 (Utah 1992); Palmer, 860 P.2d at 343; Dunn 850 P.2d at
1224-25.

Ha has established legal error.

With respect to whether the error was obvious, the trial
court in this matter heard the prosecutor's assertions, and sat
through the evidence at trial. The judge should have known the
prosecutor's surrebuttal remarks were not supported by the
evidence.

See Palmer, 860 P.2d at 343. In addition, counsel for
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the defense in closing argument pointed out that the earlier
statements were insupportable. Thus, when the prosecutor made his
surrebuttal comments with greater conviction, the trial court was
alerted to the obvious problems. Since the state failed to
present evidence to support the statistical information, there
was no basis for the prosecutor's statement that Ha was the onlyperson with a tattoo of a question mark on his forehead. The
improper statements constituted obvious error.
The third factor in Dunn is also established here. The
prosecutor's improper statements were harmful. The prosecutor
recognized that the pivotal issue in the case concerned
eyewitness identification; and the prosecutor was aware of the
reliability concerns surrounding such testimony as reflected in
an instruction presented to the jury. (See R. 90-92.)

In

anticipation of those concerns, the prosecutor sought to bolster
the testimony of his witnesses by making the strong, unfounded
statistical assertion during his surrebuttal, closing comments.
Since the improper comments went to the heart of the eyewitness
identification testimony, they likely had an impact on the jury.
"When the evidence in the record is circumstantial or
sufficiently conflicting, jurors are more likely influenced
by an improper argument. In such instances, they are more
susceptible to the suggestions that factors other than the
evidence before them should determine a defendant's guilt or
innocence." 718 P.2d at 403; accord Smith, 700 P.2d at 1112;
Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87.
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1224. In Dunn, the Utah Supreme Court
considered legally improper comments made by the prosecutor
during his initial closing statements. Id. at 1224-25.
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Defense

counsel in that case addressed the prosecutor's improper
statements during his closing response, and the prosecutor made
no further mention of the improper matters during his surrebuttal
comments. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court in that case determined that "defense
counsel's remark helped to ameliorate the harmful effect of the
prosecutor's improper comment." Id. at 1225.

This case is

distinguishable in that defense counsel was unable to ameliorate
the harmful effect of the improper, surrebuttal comments.

After

the prosecutor initially made the improper statements, defense
counsel responded to them in his closing. (R. 193:195.)
Thereafter, the prosecutor made the improper statements with
greater conviction and authority.

(R. 193:199.) To the extent

defense counsel's response weakened the initial improper
comments, the prosecutor came back stronger.
Likewise, since the jurors were weighing evidence
susceptible of differing interpretations and/or evidence
presenting reliability concerns, see State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483,
488-89 (Utah 1986) (eyewitness identification testimony should be
considered with care given reliability concerns), there was a
greater likelihood that the jurors would be improperly influenced
by prosecutorial remarks going to the heart of that issue. In
such a case, the jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing
and interpreting the evidence.

They may be especially

susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence may be
sufficient to affect the verdict.
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Counsel is obligated in such

cases to avoid, as far as possible, any reference to those
matters the jury is not justified in considering. Troy, 688 P.2d
at 486-87.
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing
conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of differing
interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that they
will be improperly influenced through remarks of counsel.
Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be searching for
guidance in weighing and interpreting the evidence. They
may be especially susceptible to influence, and a small
degree of influence may be sufficient to affect the verdict.
Troy, 688 P.2d at 486. "The insinuation that other evidence
exists encourages the jury to determine its verdict based upon
evidence outside the record and jeopardizes a defendants right
to a trial based upon the evidence presented."

Young, 853 P.2d

at 349 (finding plain error, but failing to find prejudice); see
also State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Utah 1997).
As set forth herein, the prosecutor recognized the fragile
nature of eyewitness identification testimony. The prosecutor
recognized that the "major issue in the case is did Mr. Minh Ha
stab Tai Luu and hit Hanna Kim, or are they just simply mistaken
about who it is that did this?"

(R. 193:181.)

The prosecutor sought to supplement the evidence with the
improper remarks.

A prompt, curative instruction provided by the

court at the time of the improper comments may have provided some
relief from the comments. In this matter, the jury was advised in
the jury charge that counsel!s statements do not constitute
evidence. (R. 88.) However, the jury was not advised at the time
of the improper comment that in reaching factual conclusions in
the case, it was required to rely on evidence presented through
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witnesses and exhibits, and that it should not consider the
statements of counsel in reaching conclusions. See State v.
Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 272 (Utah 1998) (court recognizes that
prompt, effective curative instruction from trial judge may
effectively neutralize damage); State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125,
1129-30 (Me. 1982) (prompt and appropriate curative instruction
in the face of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument may
alleviate damage caused by conduct; general instruction
concerning counsels' argument was insufficient); U.S. v. Solivan,
937 F.2d 1146, 1157 (6th Cir. 1991) (in cases where an admonition
has been found to mitigate or remove the taint of prosecutorial
misconduct, the admonition has been swiftly given and firm).
Here, the effect of the improper remarks was prejudicial.
Since the improper remarks here were based on speculation
and matters not in evidence, and the error was prejudicial such
that in the absence of the error there was a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for Ha, the remarks compel
the entry of an order reversing the judgment and remanding the
case for a new trial.
POINT III. HA'S TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE.
The Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to
assistance of counsel.

The right to counsel has been construed

to be "the right to effective assistance of counsel."

McMann v.

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970); accord State v.
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McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976).

The Court in Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), set forth the proper test for
determining whether counsel!s performance was ineffective:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing
that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said
that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a
breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result
unreliable.
Id. at 687; accord State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 185-86 & n.5
(Utah 1990).

Ha's counsel's performance was deficient in that he

failed to object to the prosecutor's improper surrebuttal
comments.
As set forth in Point II, supra, it should have been obvious
to defense counsel that the prosecutor's surrebuttal comments
went beyond the evidence.

(See R. 193:195.) There is no possible

tactical reason, and none is apparent from the record, for
defense counsel's failure to object to the surrebuttal remarks
and to request a curative instruction.

See State v. Bullock, 791

P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989) (tactical reason is apparent from the
record).
Ha was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to object to
the comments.

First, the comments improperly bolstered the

eyewitness identification testimony. See Point II, supra.

Where

the state failed to present evidence to support the determination
that Ha was the only person in society with a tattoo in the
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middle of his forehead, the prosecutor supplemented the evidence
with improper remarks. (R. 193:199.)
Second, even if the trial court had improperly overruled an
objection, at the very least it could have promptly and firmly
advised the jury at the time of the comments that in reaching
factual conclusions in the case, it was allowed to consider only
the evidence presented through the witnesses and exhibits
received in trial; counsel's comments may not be considered. See
Reilly. 446 A.2d at 1129 (prompt and appropriate curative
instruction may alleviate damage); Solivan. 937 F.2d at 1157 (in
cases where an admonition has been found to mitigate or remove
the taint of prosecutorial misconduct, the admonition has been
swiftly given and firm). Utah courts repeatedly have ruled that
the effects of improper statements in closing argument may be
ameliorated by proper curative instructions. See Young, 853 P.2d
at 349; Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1352-53 (curative instruction
rendered improper statements harmless).
In Pearson, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that although the
prosecutor made improper comments in front of the jury, the
comments were not likely to prejudice the outcome of the jury's
deliberations where the trial court instructed the jurors that
they were to rely only on the testimony of witnesses and the
exhibits presented in evidence in reaching factual conclusions;
they were not to rely on arguments of counsel. Pearson, 943 P.2d
at 1353. Such an instruction would have been reasonable in this
case.

Instead, the court simply provided a form instruction that
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states, "You should not consider as evidence any statement of
counsel made during the trial." (R. 88.)

Such an instruction

likely had no bearing on the jury, and did not apparently have
any relationship to the improper statistical data presented by
the prosecutor.
Third, even if the trial court had improperly overruled an
objection to the prosecutor's remarks, Ha would have properly
preserved the issue for review on the merits by this Court.
Because trial counsel failed to object, Ha has been forced to
argue plain error on appeal.

See Point II, supra.

This Court

can and should address the merits of the issue concerning the
improper remarks to alleviate this prejudice.

Ha maintains that

there was no conceivable tactical basis for failing to object to
the prosecutor's improper surrebuttal closing statements.
POINT IV. THE ERRORS AND IRREGULARITIES IN THIS CASE COMPEL
REVERSAL UNDER THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE.
The trial court's failure to make proper inquiry before
appointing a non-certified, non-qualified interpreter in this
case, and the prosecutor's improper surrebuttal comments
constitute legal error. In the event the errors alone may be
harmless, the cumulative effect of the errors requires reversal.
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah
1990); see also Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229. Here Ha was effectively
denied the opportunity to present a witness through a qualified
interpreter.

In addition, the prosecutor, cognizant of the

reliability concerns surrounding the eyewitness identification
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testimony, improperly bolstered the testimony of the state
witnesses with insupportable statistical information. The errors
alone and together should undermine this Court's confidence that
"a fair trial was had."

State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 295

(Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 617
(Utah App. 1997)).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Ha respectfully requests
that this Court reverse this case and remand for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this
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day of
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, 1999.
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)
Plaintiff,

vs.

VfY^V \ ^W

Case No._
Count No..
Honorable
Clerk
Reporter.
Bailiff
Data

Uk

O*A") p^PttA
(3SW1V)
Defendant.

.to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
• The motion of.
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted b y / ^ a jury; Qjthe court, • plea of guilty;
a felony
• plea ofioo
of no contest; of the offense of
of _
of the ^3T^dd ee g r eeaa •u• a
misdeme&ifcuV, being now present in court an< ready for sentence and
a class
class
represented by _ A . n f i f Y T L ^ . and the State being represented by i L
is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:

•
•
•
•

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $.
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of SoOT *\0Qi to.

A?P A. gM53.15c&reAAWiJ*

M

such sentence is to run concurrently with

•
•

such sentence is to run consecutively with.
upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court, Court(s)

X

Uoo^vC

0^
,

are hereby dismissed.

&\te
Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the
period of
, pursuant to the attached condition^ of probation.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County )E( for delivery to the
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
^
\
Commitment shall issue ^ ^ ^ \ ^ . «
O Q A X X " A D C £ $ 3 L O J N A A - V\£&9r tAJTVfcA, •

DATED this jjl^y

of

r^/l§

- , 1 fyXft

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney

tf>-

(white-Court)

(Green-Judge)

Page
(Yellow-Jail/Pnson/AP&P)

(Pink-Defense)

(Goldenrod-State)

-Lof_s^
\-\

IN T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT) TO
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL

Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. Count No.
Honorable
Clerk
Reporter _
Bailiff
Date

Defendant.

1WT

X^ciLv^c^r*, Tc^y Y\AO
D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is • granted • denied. There belnp no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant havinabggn convicted b y ^ a jury; • the court; • plea of guilty; • plea
of no contest; of the offense of r \ S S T \ V A T Y
ITUisdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for soptenqe
represented by
sentence a
i
and the State being represented by
9^
, is
now adjudged guilty of the above offense,

a cla

%7ft

a; Cft

is now sentenced to a term in the Salt Lake County Jail,
of
(fi
months;
k
'D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $.
^ a n d ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $_

.to.

^ ( s u c h sentence is to run concurrently with
CAPCT^
D such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, • Defense, • Court, Count(s)

** \

•

are hereby dismissed.

• Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • jail) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this
Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Probation and
Parole for the period of
pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
y^ Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, to be confined and
imprisoned in the Salt Lak£ Cqi^nty J%avil in accord£ncevwitl? this Judgment and Commitment.
^ C o m m i t m e n t shall issue
DATED this
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney

(White—Court)

(Green—Judge)

Page

(Yellow—Jail/Prison/AP&P)

(Pink—Defense)

(Goldenrod—State)

Aof

^
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(ii) equipment and support staff sufficient to provide the transcript of the
audio and video tapes in an accurate and timely manner.
(iii) no conflict of interest in the matters transcribed.
(C) Persons desiring to be certified as official court transcribers shall submit
a written proposal to the administrative office of the courts setting forth their
qualifications and ability to comply with the criteria set forth.
(3) Preparation of transcript
(A) An official court transcriber sHall prepare a transcript when assigned to
do so by the court executive.
(B) If an official court transcriber encounters a portion of the audio or video
tape recording which is inaudible or incomplete, and which, in the opinion of
the transcriber, is likely to significantly affect the accuracy and clarity of the
transcript, the official court transcriber shall report t£at fact to the court
executive and set forth the court, the date and time of the proceeding, and the
perceived problem with the recording.
(C) On each transcript, the official court transcriber shall take and subscribe to an oath affirming that the audio or video tape recording has been
transcribed accurately to the best of the transcriber's ability.
(4) List of official court transcribers. The administrative office of the courts
shall compile and distribute to the court executive a list of official court
transcribers. When an additional transcriber is certified, an updated list shall
be distributed.
(5) Assignment of transcript preparation. The court executive shall assign
the preparation of a court transcript to an official court transcriber in the
following priority:
(A) to an available official court reporter in the district, who has been
certified as an official court transcriber;
(B) to an available official court reporter in another district, who has been,
certified as an official court transcriber; and
(C) to an individual certified as an official court transcriber, who is not an
official court reporter.
(6) Complaints and sanctions. The administrative office of the courts may
investigate any complaints made concerning the performance of an official
court transcriber, and may, for good cause, rescind the certification of any
official court transcriber.
(Repealed and reenacted effective January 1, 1998.)
Repeals and Reenactmenta, — Former
Rule 3-305, relating to certified court transcribe

ers, was repealed and the present rule enacted
effective January 1, 1998.

Rule 3-306. Court interpreters.
Intent:
To declare the policy of the Utah State Courts to secure the rights of persons
who are unable, because of a non-English speaking cultural background, to
understand or communicate adequately in the English language when they are
involved in legal proceedings.
Tb outline the procedure for certification, appointment, and payment of court
interpreters.
l b provide certified interpreters in all cases in those languages for which
certification programs have been established.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to legal proceedings in the courts of record and not of
record.
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This rule shall apply to interpretation for non-English speaking persons and
not to interpretation of the hearing impaired.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Definitions.
(A) "Appointing authority" means a trial judge, administrative hearing
officer or other officer authorized by law to conduct judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, or a delegate thereof.
(B) "Certified interpreter" means a person who has fulfilled the requirements set forth in subsection 4.
(C) "Qualified interpreter" means an uncertified interpreter who has been
found by the appointment authority to be qualified pursuant to subsection
6(B).
(D) "Code of Professional Responsibility" means the Code of Professional
Responsibility for Court Interpreters set forth in Appendix H.
(E) "Legal proceeding" means a civil, criminal, domestic relations, juvenile,
traffic or administrative proceeding. Legal proceeding does not include a
conference between the non-English speaking person and the interpreter that
occurs outside the courtroom, hearing room, or chambers unless ordered by the
appointing authority. In juvenile court legal proceeding includes the intake
stage.
(F) "Non-English speaking person" means any principal party in interest or
witness participating in a legal proceeding who has limited ability to speak or
understand the English language.
(G) "Principal party in interest" means a person involved in a legal proceeding who is a named party, or who will be bound by the decision or action, or who
is foreclosed from pursuing his or her rights by the decision or action which
may be taken in the proceeding.
(H) "Witness" means anyone who testifies in any legal proceeding.
(2) Advisory panel. Policies concerning court interpreters shall be developed
by a court interpreter advisory panel, appointed by the council, comprised of
judges, court administrators, lawyers, court interpreters, and experts in the
field of linguistics.
(3) Minimum performance standards. All certified and qualified interpreters serving in the court shall comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility.
(4) Certification.
(A) Subject to the availability of funding, and in consultation with the
advisory panel, the administrative office shall establish programs to certify
court interpreters in the non-English languages most frequently needed in the
courts. The administrative office shall:
(i) designate languages for certification;
(ii) establish procedures for training and testing to certify and recertify
interpreters; and
(iii) establish, maintain, and issue to all courts in the state a current
directory of certified interpreters.
(B) To become certified an interpreter shall:
(i) prior to participation in the training program, pay a fee of $100.00 to the'administrative office to offset the costs of training and testing;
(ii) complete training as required by the administrative office;
(iii) obtain a passing score on the court interpreter's test(s) as required by
the administrative office; and
(iv) comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A
(C) An interpreter may be certified upon submission of satisfactory proof to
the advisory panel that the interpreter is certified in good standing by thei
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federal courts or by a state having a certification program that is equivalent to
the program established under this section.
(5) Recertification.
(A) Subject to the availability of funding, the administrative office shall
establish continuing educational requirements for maintenance of certified
status.
(B) To maintain certified status, a certified interpreter shall:
(i) comply with continuing educational requirements as established by the
administrative office; and
(ii) comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility.
(6) Appointment
(A) Certified interpreters. When an interpreter is requested or when the
appointing authority determines that a principal party in interest or witness
has a limited ability to understand and communicate in English, a certified
interpreter shall be appointed except under those circumstances specified in
subsection (6)(B) or (C).
(B) Qualified interpreters.
(i) Standards for appointment. A qualified interpreter may be appointed
only under the following circumstances:
(a) if there is no certification program established under subparagraph (4)
for interpreters in the language for which an interpreter is needed,
(b) if there is a certification program established under subsection (4), but
no certified interpreter is reasonably available, or
(c) for juvenile probation conferences, if the probation officer does not speak
a language understood by juvenile.
(ii) Procedure for appointment. Before appointing a qualified interpreter,
the appointing authority or delegate shall:
(a) evaluate the totality of the circumstances including the gravity of the
judicial proceeding and the potential penalty or consequence to the accused
person involved,
(b) qualify the prospective interpreter by asking questions as to the following matters in an effort to determine whether the interpreter has a minimum
level of qualification: (1) whether the prospective interpreter appears to have
adequate language skills, knowledge of interpreting techniques and familiarity with interpreting in a court or administrative hearing setting; and
(2) whether the prospective interpreter has read, understands, and agrees to
comply with the code of professional responsibility for court interpreters set
forth in appendix H.
(iii) The procedure to qualify a non-certified interpreter need not recur every
time the interpreter is used. Within each judicial district the names of
non-certified interpreters who have been qualified by the appointing authority
pursuant to subsection (6)(B) shall be placed on a list for use by the district in
cases where a certified interpreter is not reasonably available.
(iv) Court employees may serve as qualified interpreters, but their service
shall be limited to short hearings that do not take them away from their
regular duties for extended periods.
(C) Non-qualified interpreter. Anon-certified, non-qualified interpreter may
be appointed when a certified or qualified interpreter is not reasonably
available, or the court determines that the gravity of the case and potential
penalty to the accused person involved are so minor that delays attendant to
obtaining a certified or qualified interpreter are not justified.
(7) Waiver.
(A) A non-English speaking person may at any point in the proceeding
waive the right to the services of an interpreter, but only when:
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(i) the waiver is approved by the appointing authority after explaining on
the record to the non-English speaking person through an interpreter the
nature and effect of the waiver;
(ii) the appointing authority determines on the record that the waiver has
been made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; and
(iii) the non-English speaking person has been afforded the opportunity to
consult with his or her attorney.
(B) At any point in any proceeding, for good cause shown, a non-English
speaking person may retract his or her waiver and request an interpreter.
(8) Oath. All interpreters, before commencing their duties, shall take an
oath that they will make a true and impartial interpretation using their best
skills and judgment in accordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility.
(9) Removal in individual cases. Any of the following actions shall be good
cause for a judge to remove an interpreter in an individual case:
(A) being unable to interpret adequately, including where the interpreter
self-reports such inability;
(B) knowingly and willfully making false interpretation while serving in an
official capacity;
(C) knowingly and willfully disclosing confidential or privileged information
obtained while serving in an official capacity;
(D) failing to follow other standards prescribed by law and the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and
(E) failing to appear as scheduled without good cause.
(10) Removal from certified or qualified list. Any of the following actions,
shall be good cause for a court interpreter to be removed from the certified list
maintained under subsection (4)(AXiii) or from the qualified list maintained
under subsection (6)(B)(iii):
(A) knowingly and willfully making false interpretation while serving in an
official capacity;
(B) knowingly and willfully disclosing confidential or privileged information
obtained while serving in an official capacity;
(C) failing to follow other standards prescribed by law and the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and
(D) failing to appear as scheduled without good cause.
(11) Discipline. The advisory panel shall review and respond to allegations^
of violations of the Code of Professional Conduct, including decertification or?
other disciplinary measures. Interpreters being disciplined will be given notice I
of the disciplinary action and an opportunity to respond.
(12) Payment.
(A) Courts of record.
(i) In courts of record, the administrative office shall pay interpreter fees:
and expenses in
(a) criminal cases in which the defendant is determined to be indigent,
(b) juvenile court cases brought by the state,
(c) cases filed against the state pursuant to U.R.C.P. 65B(b) or 65C, and
(d) other cases in which the court determines that the state is obligated to
pay for an interpreter's services.
(ii) In all other civil cases and small claims cases, the party engaging the*
services of the interpreter shall pay the interpreter fees and expenses.
(iii) Fees. Certified court interpreters shall be paid $30 per hour. Qualified
or non-qualified court interpreters shall be paid $25 per hour. Court employees
acting as interpreters pursuant to (6XBXiv) shall be paid their regular hourly
rate and shall not receive additional payment for interpreter services.
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(iv) Expenses. Mileage for interpreters will be paid at the same rate as state
employees for each mile necessarily traveled in excess of 50 miles round trip.
Per diem expenses will be paid at the same rate as state employees.
(v) Procedure for payment. The administrative office shall pay fees and
expenses of the interpreter upon receipt of a certification of appearance signed
by the clerk of the court. The certification shall include the name, address and
social security number of the interpreter, the case number, the dates of
appearance, the language interpreted, and an itemized statement of the
amounts to be paid.
(B) Courts not of record.
(i) In courts not of record, the local government that funds the court not of
record shall pay interpreter fees and expenses in criminal cases in which the
defendant is determined to be indigent.
(ii) In small claims cases, the party engaging the services of the interpreter.
shall pay the interpreter fees and expenses.
(iii) Fees. The local government that funds the court not of record shall
establish the amount of the interpreter fees.
(iv) Expenses. The local government that funds the court not of record shall
establish interpreter expenses, if any, that will be paid.
(v) Procedure for payment. The local government that funds the court shall
pay the interpreter upon receipt of a certification of appearance signed by the
clerk of the court. The certification shall include the name, address and social
security number of the interpreter, the case number, the dates of appearance,
the language interpreted, and an itemized statement of the amounts to be
paid.
(Repealed and reenacted effective November 1, 1996; amended effective
December 13, 1996.)

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.
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APPENDIX H. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR COURT ^ T
INTERPRETERS - ^ ; ,
Introduction.

Canon

Canon
1. Accuracy and completeness.
2. Representation of qualifications.
3. Impartiality and avoidance of conflict of interest.
4^ Professional demeanor.
5. Confidentiality.

~ ^f^T** f

T^.

6. Restriction of public comment ,
7. Scope of practice. ^ ' f c s **
,
..
.
,.
.
Q A
k
8
« Assessing and reporting impediments to
^
performance,
9. Duty to report ethical violations.
10. Professional development.

Introduction.
This Code is based on the "Model Code of Professional Responsibility for
Interpreters in the Judiciary developed by the National Center for State
Courts with grant funding from the State Justice Institute, as set forth in the
publication, Court Interpretation: Model Guides for Policy and Practice in the
State Courts, Copyright 1995, National Center for State Courts.
Many persons who come before the courts are partially or completely
excluded from full participation in the proceedings due to limited English
proficiency or a speech or hearing impairment. It is essential that the resulting
communication barrier be removed, as far as possible, so that these persons are
placed in the same position as similarly situated persons for whom there is no
such barrier. 1 As officers of the court, interpreters help ensure that such
persons may enjoy equal access to justice, and that court proceedings and court
support services function efficiently and effectively. Interpreters are highly
skilled professionals who fulfill an essential role in the administration of
justice.

Applicability
This code shall guide and be binding upon all persons, agencies and
organizations who administer, supervise use, or deliver interpreting services to
the judiciary.
Comment. — The black letter principles of
the Model Code on which this Code is based are
principles of general application that are tinlikely to conflict with specific requirements of
rule or law in the states, in the opinion of the
code's drafters. Therefore, the use of the term
"shall" is reserved for the black letter principies. Statements in the commentary use the
term "should" to describe behavior that illus-

trates or elaborates upon the principles. The
commentaries are intended to convey what the
drafters of this model code believe are probable
and expected behaviors. Wherever a court policy or routine practice appears to conflict with
the commentary in this code, it is recommended
that the reasons for the policy as it applies to
court interpreters be examined,

Canon 1. Accuracy and completeness.
Interpreters shall render a complete and accurate interpretation or sight
translation, without altering, omitting, or adding anything to what is stated or
written, and without explanation.

1

A non-English speaker should be able to understand just as much as an English speaker with
the same level of education and intelligence would understand.
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Comment. — The interpreter has a twofold
duty: (1) to ensure that the proceedings in
English reflect precisely what was said by a
non-English speaking person, and (2) to place
the non-English speaking person on an equal
footing with those who understand English.
This creates an obligation to conserve every
element of information contained in a source
language communication when it is rendered in
the target language.
Therefore, interpreters are obligated to apply
their best skills and judgment to preserve faithfully the meaning of what is said in court,
including the style or register of speech. Verbatim, "word for word" or literal oral interpretations are not appropriate when they distort the
meaning of the source language, but every
spoken statement — even if it appears nonresponsive, obscene, rambling, or incoherent —
should be interpreted. This includes apparent
misstatements.

AppX. H

Interpreters should never interject their own
words, phrases, or expressions. If the need
arises to explain an interpreting problem (e.g.,
a term or phrase with no direct equivalent in
the target language or a misunderstanding
that only the interpreter can clarify), the interpreter should ask the court's permission to
provide an explanation. Interpreters should
convey the emotional emphasis of the speaker
without reenacting or mimicking the speaker's
emotions, or dramatic gestures.
The obligation to preserve accuracy includes
the interpreter's duty to correct any error of
interpretation discovered by the interpreter
during the proceeding. Interpreters should
demonstrate their professionalism by objectively analyzing any challenge to their performance.

Canon 2. Representation of qualifications.
Interpreters shall accurately and completely represent their certifications,
training, and pertinent experience.
Comment. — Acceptance of a case by an
interpreter conveys linguistic competency in
legal settings. Withdrawing or being asked to
withdraw from a case after it begins causes a
disruption of court proceedings and is wasteful
of scarce public resources. It is, therefore, es-

sential that interpreters present a complete
and truthful account of their training, certification, and experience prior to appointment so
the officers of the court can fairly evaluate their
qualifications for delivering interpreting services.

Canon 3. Impartiality and avoidance of conflict of interest*
Interpreters shall be impartial and unbiased and shall refrain from conduct
that may give an appearance of bias. Interpreters shall disclose any real or
perceived conflict of interest.
Comment. — The interpreter serves as an
officer of the court, and the interpreter's duty in
a court proceeding is to serve the court and the
public to which the court is a servant. This is
true regardless of whether the interpreter is
publicly retained at government expense or
retained privately at the expense of one of the
parties.
The interpreter should avoid any conduct or
behavior that presents the appearance of favoritism toward any of the parties. Interpreters
should maintain professional relationships
with their clients and should not take an active
part in any of the proceedings. The interpreter
should discourage a non-English speaking party's personal dependence.
During the course of the proceedings interpreters should not converse with parties, witnesses, jurors, attorneys, or with friends or
relatives of any party, except in the discharge of
their official functions. It is especially important that interpreters, who are often familiar
with attorneys or other members of the courtroom work group, including law enforcement
officers, refrain from casual and personal conversations with anyone in court that may convey an appearance of a special relationship or
partiality to any of the court participants.

The interpreter should strive for professional
detachment. Verbal and non-verbal displays of
personal attitudes, prejudices, emotions, or
opinions should be avoided at all times.
Should an interpreter become aware that a
proceeding participant views the interpreter as
having a bias or being biased, the interpreter
should disclose that knowledge to the appropriate judicial authority and counsel.
Any condition that interferes with the objectivity of an interpreter constitutes a conflict of
interest. Before providing services in a matter,
court interpreters must disclose to all parties
and presiding officials any prior involvement,
whether personal or professional, that could be
reasonably construed as a conflict of interest.
This disclosure should not include privileged or
confidential information.
The following are circumstances that are
presumed to create actual or apparent conflicts
of interest for interpreters where interpreters
should not serve:
1. The interpreter is a friend, associate, or
relative of a party or counsel for a party involved in the proceedings;
2. The interpreter has served in an investigative capacity for any party involved in the
case;

Appx. H

CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

3. The interpreter has previously been retained by a law enforcement agency to assist in
the preparation of the criminal case at issue;
4. The interpreter or the interpreter's spouse
or child has a financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that would be
affected by the outcome of the case;
5. The interpreter has been involved in the
choice of counsel or law firm for that case.
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Interpreters should disclose to the court and
other parties when they have previously been
retained for private employment by one of the
parties in the case.
Interpreters should not serve in any matter
in which payment for their services is contingent upon the outcome of the case.
An interpreter who is also an attorney should
not serve in both capacities in the same matter.

Canon 4. Professional demeanor.
Interpreters shall conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the
dignity of the court and shall be as unobtrusive as possible.
Comment. — Interpreters should know and
observe the established protocol, rules, and
procedures for delivering interpreting services.
When speaking in English, interpreters should
speak at a rate and volume that enables them
to be heard and understood throughout the
courtroom, but the interpreter's presence
should otherwise be as unobtrusive as possible.
Interpreters should work without drawing undue or inappropriate attention to themselves.

Interpreters should dress in a manner that is
consistent with the dignity ofthe proceedings of
the court.
Interpreters should avoid obstructing the
view of any of the individuals involved in the
proceedings.
Interpreters are encouraged to avoid personal or professional conduct that could discredit the court

Canon 5. Confidentiality.
Interpreters shall protect the confidentiality of all privileged and other
confidential information.
Comment. — The interpreter must protect
and uphold the confidentiality of all privileged
information obtained during the course of her
or his duties. It is especially important that the
interpreter understand and uphold the attorney-client privilege which requires confidentiality with respect to any communication between attorney and client. This rule also
applies to other types of privileged communications.
Interpreters must also refrain from repeating
or disclosing information obtained by them in

the course of their employment that may be
relevant to the legal proceeding.
In the event that an interpreter becomes
aware of information that suggests imminent
harm to someone or relates to a crime being
committed during the course of the proceedings, the interpreter should immediately disclose the information to an appropriate authority within the judiciary who is not involved in
the proceeding and seek advice in regard to the
potential conflict in professional responsibility.

Canon 6. Restriction of public comment.
Interpreters shall not publicly discuss, report, or offer an opinion concerning
a matter in which they are or have been engaged, even when that information
is not privileged or required by law to be confidential.
Canon 7. Scope of practice.
Interpreters shall limit themselves to interpreting or translating and shall
not give legal advice, express personal opinions to individuals for whom they
are interpreting, or engage in any other activities which may be construed to
constitute a service other than interpreting or translating while serving as an
interpreter.
Comment. — Since interpreters are responsible only for enabling others to communicate,
they should limit themselves to the activity of
interpreting or translating only. Interpreters
should refrain from initiating communications
while interpreting unless it is necessary for

ensuring an accurate and faithful interpretation.
Interpreters may be required to initiate communications during a proceeding when they
find it necessary to seek assistance in performing their duties. Examples of such drcum-
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stances include seeking direction when unable
to understand or express a word or thought,
requesting speakers to moderate their rate of
communication or repeat or rephrase something, correcting their own interpreting errors,
or notifying the court of reservations about
their ability to satisfy an assignment competently. In such instances they should make it
clear that they are speaking for themselves.
An interpreter may convey legal advice from
an attorney to a person only while that attorney
is giving it. An interpreter should not explain
the purpose of forms, services, or otherwise act

Appx. H

as counselors or advisors unless they are interpreting for someone who is acting in that official capacity. The interpreter may translate
language on a form for a person who is filling
out the form, but may not explain the form or
its purpose for such a person.
The interpreter should not personally serve
to perform official acts that are the official
responsibility of other court officials including,
but not limited to, court clerks, pretrial release
investigators or interviewers, or probation
counselors.

Canon 8. Assessing and reporting impediments to performance.
Interpreters shall assess at all times their ability to deliver their services.
When interpreters have any reservation about their ability to satisfy an
assignment competently, they shall immediately convey that reservation to the
appropriate judicial authority
Comment. — If the communication mode or
language of the non-English-speaking person
cannot be readily interpreted, the interpreter
should notify the appropriate judicial authority.
Interpreters should notify the appropriate
judicial authority of any environmental or
physical limitation that impedes or hinders
their ability to deliver interpreting services
adequately, e.g., the court room is not quiet
enough for the interpreter to hear or be heard
by the non-English speaker, more than one
person at a time is speaking, or principals or
witnesses of the court are speaking at a rate of
speed that is too rapid for the interpreter to
adequately interpret. Interpreters should notify the presiding officer of the need to take
periodic breaks to maintain mental and physical alertness and prevent interpreter fatigue.
Interpreters should recommend and encourage
the use of team interpreting whenever necessary.
Interpreters are encouraged to make inquiries as to the nature of a case whenever possible
before accepting an assignment. This enables
interpreters to match more closely their professional qualifications, skills, and experience to
potential assignments and more accurately as-

sess their ability to satisfy those assignments
competently.
Even competent and experienced interpreters may encounter cases in which routine proceedings suddenly involve technical or specialized terminology unfamiliar to the interpreter,
e.g., the unscheduled testimony of an expert
witness. When such instances occur, interpreters should request a brief recess to familiarize
themselves with the subject matter. If familiarity with the terminology requires extensive
time or more intensive research, interpreters
should inform the presiding officer.
Interpreters should refrain from accepting a
case if they feel the language and subject matter of that case are likely to exceed their skills
or capacities. Interpreters should feel no compunction about notifying the presiding officer if
they feel unable to perform competently, due to
lack of familiarity with terminology, preparation, or difficulty in understanding a witness or
defendant.
Interpreters should notify the presiding officer of any personal bias they may have involving any aspect of the proceedings. For example,
an interpreter who has been the victim of a
sexual assault may wish to be excused from
interpreting in cases involving similar offenses.

Canon 9. Duty to report ethical violations.
Interpreters shall report to the proper judicial authority any effort to impede
their compliance with any law, any provision of this code, or any other official
policy governing court interpreting and legal translating.
Comment — Because the users of interpreting services frequently misunderstand the
proper role of the interpreter, they may ask or
expect the interpreter to perform duties or
engage in activities that run counter to the
provisions of this code or other laws, regulations, or policies governing court interpreters.
It is incumbent upon the interpreter to inform

such persons of his or her professional obligations. If, having been apprised of these obligations, the person persists in demanding that
the interpreter violate them, the interpreter
should turn to a supervisory interpreter, a
judge, or another official with jurisdiction over
interpreter matters to resolve the situation.
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Canon 10. Professional development.
Interpreters shall continually improve their skills and knowledge and
advance the profession through activities such as professional training and
education, and interaction with colleagues, and specialists in related fields.
Comment. — Interpreters must continually
strive to increase their knowledge of the Ianguages they work in professionally, including
past and current trends in technical, vernacular, and regional terminology as well as their
application within court proceedings.
Interpreters should keep informed of all statutes, rules of courts and policies of the judiciary

that relate to the performance of their professional duties.
An interpreter should seek to elevate the
standards of the profession through participation in workshops, professional meetings, inter^^^
^ t h colleagues, and reading current
literature in the field,

